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I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine a spouse, shortly after his wife’s death, learning from
the trustee of his wife’s revocable trust that the home in which she
lived for twenty years, and in which the couple lived for fifteen
years after their marriage, was not considered by the trustee to be
the deceased wife’s homestead and that he needs to move out.
Although the husband is speechless, the trustee calmly explains
that, prior to marriage, the wife transferred her house into a
revocable trust, which leaves the home to her children from a
previous marriage. The trustee continues that, because the trustee
owned the house at the wife’s death, the home is not considered
the wife’s homestead under the descent statute. Further, the
trustee says the fact that the wife was a resident of a nursing home
for the last year of her life means that she also did not occupy the
home, another necessary requirement for defining a homestead.
The outraged husband seeks out an attorney to litigate the issue of
whether he is entitled to remain in the home that he and his wife
shared during their marriage.
Imagine next a younger couple who marry after living in and
owning their own homes. The couple resides in the wife’s house
while they completely remodel the husband’s home. The husband
dies unexpectedly in a car accident, but the couple had not yet
taken up residence in the husband’s home, and the husband had
not changed his will that left everything to his parents and siblings,
the husband had not transferred his home into joint tenancy with
his wife. The personal representative of the husband’s estate
informs the wife that she is not entitled to the home she and her
late husband had spent countless hours remodeling, and where
they intended to live, because the house was uninhabitable and
therefore not capable of being occupied by the husband as his
homestead. In any event, the personal representative says, the
husband could only have one homestead so it must be the wife’s
house where he was living at death.
Most married couples acquire and own their homes in the
traditional manner. They buy it together during the marriage and
own it in joint tenancy. However, with the increasing frequency of
second marriages, marriages that occur later in life and after
significant wealth accumulation, the possibility of these
hypothetical scenarios actually coming into the legal practitioner’s
door is not as remote as it may seem. Further, these cases present
practitioners with a more complicated issue than it may seem at
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first blush because of the lack of a clear and specific definition of
the term “homestead,” as it is used in the descent of homestead
statute. The difficulty is not in defining the term homestead, as it is
well settled that it is a dwelling owned and occupied by the
1
decedent at his or her death. Rather, the difficulty is in
ascertaining, with a sufficient degree of certainty to avoid
protracted and expensive litigation, what it means to “own or
occupy” a dwelling for purposes of creating a homestead. Prior to
analyzing the issues that may arise in the litigation of ownership
and occupation, it is necessary to examine what existing law holds
with respect to the descent of the homestead.
II. THE DESCENT OF THE HOMESTEAD
A. Minn. Stat. § 524.2-402
In Minnesota, the homestead descends to the surviving spouse,
regardless of any testamentary or other disposition, if there are no
2
surviving descendants of the decedent. If there are surviving
descendants of the decedent, then the homestead descends to the
surviving spouse for life and the remainder in equal shares to the
3
decedent’s descendants by representation.
Specifically, the
relevant portions of the descent of homestead statute provide as
follows:
(a) If there is a surviving spouse, the homestead,
including a manufactured home which is the
family residence, descends free from any
1. See infra notes 20-47 and accompanying text.
2. See M INN. STAT. § 524.2-402 (2000). A comment should be made about
when a person is a decedent’s surviving spouse. Minnesota Statutes section 524.2802 provides that when a marriage to a decedent has been dissolved or annulled
then the person is not a surviving spouse. However, this same statute provides that
“[a] decree of separation which does not terminate the status of husband and wife
is not a dissolution of marriage for purposes of this section.” Based upon this
provision, the Minnesota Court of Appeals held that a decedent’s estranged wife
was his “surviving spouse” and, therefore, was entitled to her elective share even
though (1) the estranged wife and decedent were separated, (2) the decedent had
led the wife to believe that they were divorced when, in fact, they had not been
divorced, and (3) the wife had remarried even though she had not been divorced.
See In re Estate of Kueber, 390 N.W.2d 22, 23-24 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986). The court
further denied the personal representative’s argument that equitable principles
should preclude decedent’s estranged wife from taking her elective share. Id. at
24.
3. M INN. STAT. § 524.2-402(a)(2).
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testamentary or other disposition of it to which
the spouse has not consented in writing or as
provided by law, as follows:
1) if there is no surviving descendant of
decedent, to the spouse; or
2) if there are surviving descendants of
decedent, then to the spouse for the term of
the spouse’s natural life and the remainder
in equal shares to the decedent’s
descendants by representation.
(b) If there is no surviving spouse and the
homestead has not been disposed of by will it
4
descends as other real estate. . . .
Minnesota’s descent of homestead statute does not provide a
definition of the word “homestead;” however the following
discussion will address what courts have interpreted to be the
5
meaning of homestead under the homestead descent statute.
B. Dower and Homestead Rights Historically
Legal protection for the rights of a surviving spouse and
children arise out of a surviving spouse’s right to a dower or curtesy
interest in the deceased spouse’s lands, to which homestead rights
6
closely resemble. Dower and curtesy rights in Minnesota vested in
fee, to the surviving spouse, a one-third interest in all real property
owned by the deceased spouse at his death, with the residue being
7
vested in equal shares to the decedent’s children. These rights
were in addition to the right of a surviving spouse to the homestead
8
or to a life estate in the homestead. Dower and curtesy rights have
9
been abolished in Minnesota, but the right to an interest in
homestead continues. This right was first statutorily created in
10
1876. In 1878, the statute was amended to read:
The surviving spouse or husband shall also be entitled to
hold for the term of his or her natural life, free from all
claims on account of the debts of the deceased, the
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

Id.
Id.
See In re Wightman, 31 Minn. 168, 169, 17 N.W. 280, 280 (1883).
Snortum v. Snortum, 155 Minn. 230, 233, 193 N.W. 304, 306 (1923).
Id.
1925 Minn. Laws 174 § 2.
1876 Minn. Laws 37 § 1.
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homestead of such deceased, as such homestead may be
defined in11 the statutes relating to homestead
exemptions.
The statute, as newly amended in 1878, specifically referenced
the exemption statute for a definition of what constituted a
homestead under the descent statute and courts were directed to
12
look to the exemption statute for guidance. Courts at that time
found that a homestead was a dwelling that was owned and
13
occupied by the person claiming the homestead. The current
version of the descent of homestead statute does not refer to the
exemption statute for the definition of what constitutes a
homestead, and therefore, homestead under the descent statute is
14
not defined.
By 1894, the homestead statute had been amended again and
provided, in substance, for the same rights that a surviving spouse
15
with children has under the current statute. In particular, the law
in 1894 provided that the homestead descended free from any
testamentary devise or other disposition to which the spouse had
16
not consented in writing and was free from all debt. Further, the
homestead descended to the surviving spouse for the term of his or
her natural life, and the remainder to the decedent’s children or
17
grandchildren by right of representation. As the Minnesota
Supreme Court noted, these early descent of homestead statutes
were a departure from previous legislative policy and designed to
provide for the surviving spouse and to preserve the homestead for
18
the children, notwithstanding the will of the decedent.
Therefore, the rights of a surviving spouse and surviving children
to an interest in the homestead has a long-standing history in
Minnesota. Despite this history, there are surprisingly few cases
discussing what constitutes a decedent’s homestead or what it
means to own and occupy a dwelling for homestead purposes.
Examination of the potentially litigious issues involving the descent
11. M INN. GEN. ST. c. 46, § 2 (1878). In re Baillif’s Estate, 40 Minn. 172, 173,
41 N.W. 1059, 1059 (1889)(discussing whether the house and lot qualified as a
homestead “within the meaning of section 2, c. 46, Gen. St. 1878”).
12. In re Baillif’s Estate, 40 Minn. at 173, 41 N.W. at 1059.
13. Id. at 173, 41 N.W. at 1059. See also M INN. GEN. ST. c. 68 § 1 (1878).
14. See supra notes 3-5 and accompanying text.
15. See M INN. GEN. ST. § 4470 (1894). See also Schacht v. Schacht, 86 Minn.
91, 92, 90 N.W. 127, 128 (1902). Cf. M INN. STAT. § 524.2-402.
16. M INN. GEN. ST. § 4470 (1894).
17. Id.
18. Schacht, 86 Minn. at 94, 90 N.W. at 129.
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of a homestead requires an understanding of existing case law and
attempts by Minnesota courts to define the meaning of homestead
in a variety of contexts.
C. Homestead Defined: “Owned and Occupied”
There is no explicit definition of the word homestead
19
contained within the descent of homestead statute. However, the
homestead statute does indicate that a homestead includes a
20
“manufactured home which is the family residence.” However,
the Minnesota Court of Appeals has made it very clear that the
phrase “family residence” contained in the statute is of no import
to non-mobile dwellings, and that this phrase is simply a
recognition by the legislature that manufactured homes may be
21
homesteads.
Further, the court of appeals has held that a
property’s status as a family residence is irrelevant under the
22
descent of homestead statute.
The court of appeals in Cleys v. Cleys, one of the few cases to
address the definition of a homestead for purposes of the descent
statute, looked to Minnesota’s homestead exemption statute which
23
protects a debtor’s homestead from attachment and seizure.
Therefore, the court in Cleys v. Cleys adopted the homestead
exemption definition that a house owned and occupied by a debtor
as the debtor’s dwelling place shall constitute the homestead of the
24
debtor and the debtor’s family. However, simply stating that a
homestead is one that is owned and occupied as a dwelling place
does not end the inquiry. The court of appeals later held that “the
test to determine if a house is ‘owned and occupied‘ . . . is whether
the ownership and occupancy affords “a ‘significant “community
connection” . . .’ [that allows] the debtor and his or her family . . .
25
to be self-sustaining.”
The facts in Cleys v. Cleys involved a decedent who resided in a
resort during the tourist season, stayed at another property he
19. See M INN. STAT. § 524.2-402 (2000).
20. Id.
21. See Cleys v. Cleys, 363 N.W.2d 65, 70 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
22. Id. (citing St. Denis v. Mullen, 157 Minn. 266, 196 N.W. 258 (1923); Rux
v. Adam, 143 Minn. 35, 172 N.W. 912 (1919); Murphy v. Renner, 99 Minn. 348,
109 N.W. 593 (1906)).
23. See Cleys, 363 N.W.2d at 70 (citing M INN. STAT. § 510.01 (1982)).
24. See id.
25. Id. (citing Denzer v. Prendergast, 267 Minn. 212, 218, 126 N.W.2d. 440,
444 (1964)).
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owned for a couple of weeks in the fall and spring, and lived the
26
rest of the year in his mother’s home in Illinois. The court
upheld the decision that the resort property was the decedent’s
homestead by examining specific facts of the case: the decedent
had occupied the main resort house for a substantial part of the
year; maintained his personal effects there throughout the year;
was living in the resort house when he entered the hospital before
his death; maintained a Minnesota driver’s license; filed Minnesota
income taxes; and had made declarations that he believed the
27
resort property to be his homestead. In doing so, the court noted
that the statute does not require uninterrupted physical presence
28
at a dwelling in order to make it one’s homestead.
The court in Cleys v. Cleys also notes that another statute
protects spousal interests in the homestead, specifically with
reference to filing and recording conveyances made by one spouse
29
without the consent of the other during the marriage. This
conveyance statute provides that one spouse may not convey the
homestead during the marriage unless the other spouse consents
30
in writing. A spouse may, however, convey property other than
the homestead that is owned by that spouse without the consent of
31
the other. A deed of conveyance of the homestead by one spouse
during the marriage without the other spouse’s written consent is a
32
nullity and is void. Since this conveyance statute only protects a
spouse from inter vivos conveyances of the homestead that occur
during the marriage, and is not relevant to conveyances made prior
to the marriage or by a testamentary disposition after death, it is of
little assistance in resolving disputes that may result after death as
33
to the descent of the homestead. However, the fact that this
separate conveyance statute protects a spouse from unwanted
transfers of the homestead during marriage underlies the principle
noted by the Minnesota Supreme Court that these statutes are
26. Id. at 68.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 70.
29. See Cleys, 363 N.W.2d at 69-70. See also M INN. STAT. § 507.02 (2000)
(stating the conveyance of homestead is “subject to the rights of the other spouse
therein”).
30. M INN. STAT. § 507.02.
31. Id.
32. See Rux v. Adam, 143 Minn. 35, 38, 172 N.W. 912, 914 (1919).
33. See M INN. STAT. § 507.02. An examination of restrictions on inter-vivos
conveyances of the homestead during the marriage is beyond the scope of this
article.
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designed “to preserve the homestead for the family even at the
34
sacrifice of just demands.”
Although the court in Cleys v. Cleys held that the property’s
status as a family residence is irrelevant under the descent statute,
clearly some significant physical presence by the decedent is
necessary in order to qualify the dwelling as a homestead under the
35
descent statute. As the Minnesota Supreme Court noted in a 1898
decision, “[a]ctual occupancy, as distinguished from mere
possession (which may be constructive), is the prominent idea
36
associated with the word ‘homestead.’” However, the term “actual
occupancy” must be reasonably construed and does not require
37
constant physical presence at the dwelling. In fact, a person’s
absence from a dwelling as a result of some casualty, for business or
for pleasure has long been recognized not to constitute a removal,
abandonment or a ceasing of occupancy of a dwelling for
38
homestead purposes.
It has also been held that a parcel of
property cannot be claimed as a homestead where a person never
occupies the property as his residence, but rather occupied a
39
rented dwelling as his regular place of abode. Although the
appellate courts of this state have never specifically stated that the
intention of a decedent or owner to make a dwelling his or her
homestead is a significant consideration, the implication is
40
apparent in the courts’ review of the facts of each case. For
example, in Clark v. Dewey, the supreme court found it significant
that the record amply reflected an intent by the owner to leave the
premises and to never occupy it again as his home or place of
41
abode.
It should also be noted that if the decedent leaves
significant property, for example a farm, that the homestead rights
34. See Holden v. Farwell, Ozmun, Kirk & Co., 223 Minn. 550, 559, 27 N.W.2d
641, 646 (1947).
35. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
36. Clark v. Dewey, 71 Minn. 108, 110, 73 N.W. 639, 639-40 (1898).
37. Id. at 110, 73 N.W.2d at 640.
38. Id.
39. See In re Flanagan’s Estate, 196 Minn. 140, 142, 264 N.W. 433, 434 (1936).
40. See id. See also Clark v. Dewey, 71 Minn. at 110-11, 73 N.W. at 640 and
Cleys v. Cleys, 363 N.W.2d 65, 71 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
41. See Clark, 71 Minn. at 110-11, 73 N.W. at 640. It must be noted that this
case did not involve the descent of homestead statute; but rather a forced sale to
satisfy a judgment against the owner. Id. at 110, 73 N.W. at 639. There are very
few cases in Minnesota that deal specifically with the concept of homestead under
the descent statute, which is likely why the court in Cleys v. Cleys looked to the
homestead exemption statute and associated case law in its analysis of the descent
statute. See supra notes 19-31 and accompanying text.
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of the surviving spouse are limited to the land which the decedent
actually devoted to homestead purposes and that was actually
42
occupied as the homestead at the time of death.
Since the court of appeals, in its most recent and most relevant
case, used the homestead debtor exemption statute in its analysis of
what constitutes a homestead for purposes of the descent statute, a
closer look at the exemption statute may provide guidance for how
the courts may look at unresolved descent of homestead issues in
the future. The homestead exemption statute specifically provides
that if a debtor is married, the title to the homestead may be vested
in either spouse and that “[a]ny interest in the land, whether legal
or equitable, shall constitute ownership, within the meaning of this
43
chapter.” Under this statute, the Minnesota Supreme Court has
44
construed homestead interests liberally. For example, in Cargill, a
160-acre farm, title to which was held by a family farm corporation
(Hedge Farm, Inc.), the couple who farmed and had a house on
the property was entitled to claim a homestead exemption in eighty
45
acres of the farm upon which the party resided. This liberal
construction of homestead has long been recognized in the State of
Minnesota. In another case, the supreme court held that property
held in trust by J for the benefit of his brother M, which was
occupied by M as his residence, constituted M’s homestead and he
was deemed the actual owner of the property even though legal
46
title was held by his brother J.
Although a dispute may arise as to whether a dwelling and
parcel of property are in fact a decedent’s homestead, if homestead
status is conferred, the interests in the homestead vest in the
surviving spouse and surviving children immediately and absolutely
upon the decedent’s death and without any act on the survivors’
47
part or the part of the probate court.

42. See King v. McCarthy, 54 Minn. 190, 195, 55 N.W. 960, 961 (1893).
43. M INN. STAT. § 510.04 (2000).
44. See Cargill, Inc. v. Hedge, 358 N.W.2d 490, 492 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984),
aff’d, 375 N.W.2d 477 (Minn. 1985).
45. Id. at 493.
46. See Jelinek v. Stepan, 41 Minn. 412, 43 N.W. 90 (1889).
47. See In re Lee, 171 Minn. 182, 185-86, 213 N.W. 736, 737 (1927); In re
Walberg’s Estate, 130 Minn. 462, 466, 153 N.W. 876, 878 (1915). Although these
cases remain good law, under the present descent statute a surviving spouse must
file a petition for her homestead rights or she will be deemed to consent to a
contrary disposition of the homestead. See M INN. STAT. § 524.2-402.
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D. The Homestead Allowance Under the Uniform Probate Code
Although not necessarily probative to litigation issues arising
in the context of the descent of the homestead, it is advisable to
examine how the Uniform Probate Code, which has been largely
adopted in Minnesota, addresses the descent of the homestead.
The Uniform Probate Code, while allowing for some interest by the
surviving spouse with respect to the homestead, does not give the
surviving spouse any substantial interest of the homestead in fee, or
48
if there are children of the decedent, a life estate. Rather, the
Uniform Probate Code provides a decedent’s surviving spouse a
49
homestead allowance in the amount of $15,000. If there is no
surviving spouse, each minor child and dependent of the decedent
is entitled to the $15,000 homestead allowance divided equally
50
among them.
Like Minnesota, the Uniform Probate Code
homestead allowance is exempt from all claims against the estate
and is added to any share passing by will, intestate succession, or
51
elective share. There is an optional provision in the Uniform
Probate Code for states that have constitutional provisions for
either fee title to, or a life estate in, the homestead, which provides
that the value of the constitutional homestead shall be charged
52
against the homestead allowance. Clearly Minnesota’s descent of
homestead statute provides greater security for the surviving spouse
and may provide the surviving spouse with a greater financial
benefit as well depending upon whether he or she receives the
homestead in fee and depending upon the value of the life
53
interest.
E. Treatment of the Homestead in Other States
Other states take a myriad of different approaches with respect
to a surviving spouse’s interest in the homestead, as well as give a
54
variety of different definitions to the term homestead. An
48. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-402 (1993). But see M INN. STAT. § 524.2-402
(2000).
49. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-402.
50. Id.
51. M INN. STAT. § 524.2-402; UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-402.
52. UNIF. PROBATE CODE § 2-402A.
53. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
54. An examination of the homestead-related statutes and homestead
provisions in various state constitutions of all fifty states is well outside the scope of
this article. The state statutes discussed in this section are by way of example and
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examination of some of these differing approaches emphasizes the
importance of Minnesota’s approach descending the homestead to
the surviving spouse.
1. Varying Approaches to the Homestead Allowance
The approaches taken by states providing some interest in the
decedent’s homestead to the surviving spouse can be sorted into
four categories: a) Uniform Probate Code states; b) constitutional
or statutory descent homestead states; c) residency during probate
proceedings or at the discretion of the court; and d) other
55
miscellaneous approaches.
a. Uniform Probate Code States
Numerous states have adopted the homestead allowance
56
approach recommended by the Uniform Probate Code. The
amount of the homestead allowance varies from state to state, but
57
ranges from $7,500 to $27,000. Some states employ a homestead
allowance in connection with other homestead provisions for the
surviving spouse that impact the right to the homestead and the
58
amount of the allowance.
b. Constitutional or Statutory Homesteads
This category of states provides either a life estate or fee simple
rights to the surviving spouse and children. Minnesota is an
59
example of a state providing a statutory right to homestead.
Minnesota is fairly unique in that it grants the surviving spouse fee

are not all inclusive of the nuances that exist among the descent of homestead
statutes in the various states. For a brief summary of the history and development
of homestead rights and allowances in the United States see the statutory note
following RESTATEMENT (SECOND) PROPERTY: DONATIVE TRANSFERS § 1.1 (1992).
55. Examples of each will be discussed in turn.
56. See supra notes 48-53 and accompanying text.
57. Examples of states having homestead allowances and their respective
amounts include the following: $27,000–ALASKA STAT. § 13.12.402 (Michie 2001);
$20,000--M ONT. CODE ANN. § 72-2-412 (2001); $18,000--ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 14-2402A
(West 2001); $15,000–HAW. REV. STAT. § 560:2-402 (2001); M ICH. COMP. LAWS §
700.2402 (2002); M O. REV. STAT. § 474.290 (2001); $10,000–M E . REV. STAT. ANN.
tit. 18-A § 2-401 (2001); $7,500–NEB. REV. STAT. § 30-2322 (2001).
58. See WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 2-5-103 and 2-7-501 to 2-7-509 (2002) ($30,000);
ALA. CODE § 43-8-110 (2002) ($6,000). See infra notes 77-80 and accompanying
text (disscussing these two statutes).
59. See supra notes 2-5 and accompanying text.
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60

title to the homestead if there are no children. Vermont’s
homestead statute provides that the decedent’s homestead, not
exceeding $75,000 in value, shall pass and vest in the surviving
spouse and be set out to the surviving spouse by the probate
61
court.
These statutes, however, make no provision for the
62
surviving children. The Vermont Supreme Court has noted that
the homestead right of a surviving spouse is of paramount
63
importance. Further, homestead rights take precedence over the
fundamental right to make a testamentary disposition, and any
64
effort to will away the homestead right must fail.
Other states provide only a life estate to the surviving spouse.
Rhode Island, for example, provides only a life estate to the
surviving spouse and subjects the spouse to any encumbrances on
65
the property existing at death.
Case law in Rhode Island
invalidates transfers of property into revocable trusts for purposes
of defeating a surviving spouse’s homestead right on the ground
66
that such a transfer is “illusory.” New Hampshire also provides a
life estate in the surviving spouse, and has a statutory provision
specifying that a conveyance of real property by deed to trustees of
a revocable trust shall not result in the loss of homestead rights by
the person executing the deed, unless the deed contains an express
67
release of homestead rights. Several states, however, provide
simply a right of occupancy, rather than the vesting of a life estate,
and when the surviving spouse ceases to occupy the homestead,
68
whether before or upon death, his or her rights terminate.
Therefore, under these provisions, once a spouse ceases to occupy
69
the homestead it descends according to the other laws of descent.
Florida is an example of a constitutional homestead state, which
provides that the homestead shall not be “subject to devise if the

60. Id.
61. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, §§ 101, 105 (2001).
62. Id.
63. See Budde v. Pierce, 375 A.2d 984, 986 (Vt. 1977).
64. Id.
65. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 33-25-2(a) (2001). See also ARK. CODE. ANN. § 28-39201 (Michie 2001); TENN. CODE ANN. § 31-1-104 (2001).
66. See Pezza v. Pezza, 690 A.2d 345, 348-50 (R.I. 1997). Although the result is
the same, this is a different approach taken by the tentative draft of the
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) TRUSTS § 25. See infra notes 114-122 and accompanying text.
67. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 480:3-a (1992) and 480:9 (Supp. 2001).
68. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 427.070 (Michie 2001).
69. See id.
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owner is survived by a spouse or minor child.”

c. Residency During Probate Proceedings
Numerous states have separate provisions allowing a surviving
spouse to possess and occupy the homestead during the pendency
of the probate proceedings or for an indefinite period of time at
the discretion of the court. For example, Connecticut allows the
family of the decedent to remain in the dwelling house occupied by
the decedent at the time of his or her death, and allows them to
occupy all land and buildings connecting with the dwelling house
for as long as the court deems necessary for the family’s
convenience and comfort until the property is sold, distributed or
71
otherwise disposed of. South Dakota allows a surviving spouse to
continue to possess and occupy the whole homestead until it is
72
otherwise disposed of by law. Further, upon the death of both
spouses “the children may continue to possess and occupy the
73
whole homestead until the youngest child becomes of age.” Iowa
allows a surviving spouse to occupy the homestead until it is
74
otherwise disposed of according to law. However, a surviving
spouse in Iowa is also able to elect to retain the homestead for life
75
in lieu of a dower interest in the real estate of decedent. The
purpose of the occupancy statute in Iowa is merely a protection for
the surviving spouse to remain in possession of the homestead
prior to her taking her distributive share of the decedent’s estate or
76
electing a life interest in the homestead.
d. Other Miscellaneous Approaches
A number of states use a combination of approaches to the
homestead allowance and a surviving spouse’s interest in the
homestead. For example, Wyoming provides a homestead
allowance equal to the amount of the homestead exemption of
77
$30,000. If the appraisal of the property determines the value to
be less than $30,000, the court shall order the homestead set off to
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.

See FLA. STAT. ch. 732.4015 (2001). See also FLA. CONST. art. X, § 4(a).
CONN. GEN. ST. § 45a-321 (2001).
See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 43-31-13 (Michie 2001).
Id.
See IOWA CODE § 561.11 (2001).
See id. at § 561.12.
See Wadle v. Boston Market Co., 191 N.W. 528, 529 (1923).
See WYO. STAT. ANN. §§ 2-5-103, 2-7-504, and 2-7-508 (Michie 2001).
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78

the persons entitled to it. However, if the appraisal determines
the value to be greater than $30,000, the property will be divided if
possible, and if not possible, the property will be sold and the
proceeds divided to the persons having an interest in the
79
homestead. Alabama is an example of a state that provides a
homestead allowance, but also provides a constitutional right to the
80
homestead in the family home.
2. How Several States Define Homestead
Among the states that provide some occupancy, life estate, or
fee interest in the homestead to the surviving spouse or children,
several of the states have undertaken to define homestead within
the statute or within the state’s homestead exemption statute. New
Hampshire, for example, defines the homestead exemption in the
same manner as Minnesota in that a homestead is defined as
81
property owned and occupied as a dwelling. A bankruptcy case
citing this statute held that for the creation of the homestead right,
the occupancy must be actual and physical in nature, but that
temporary absence with no intent to abandon the property may still
82
be sufficient.
Similarly, the Vermont homestead exemption
statute defines the homestead as the dwelling house, outbuildings
83
and land used as such. Again, ownership and occupancy have
84
been held to be the key inquiries, but a significant absence will
not destroy the homestead character of the property if there is
85
shown an intent to return to the homestead.
Iowa’s homestead exemption statute provides that “the
homestead must embrace the house used as a home by the owner,”
and if the owner has two or more houses used as such the owner
86
may select which one will retain the homestead status. Again,
occupancy of the dwelling house, except when the owner is
temporarily absent with the intent to return, is essential to claim

78.
79.
80.
208.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id. at § 2-7-506.
Id. at § 2-7-507.
See ALA. CODE § 43-8-110 (2001). See also ALA. CONST. of 1901, art. X, §
See N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 480:1 (2001). Cf. M INN. STAT. § 510.01 (2000).
See In re Eckols, 63 B.R. 523, 524-25 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1986).
See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 27, § 101 (2001).
In re Brent, 68 B.R. 893, 894-96 (Bankr. D.Vt. 1987).
See In re Avery, 41 B.R. 224 (Bankr. D.Vt. 1984).
See IOWA CODE § 561.1 (2001).
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87

the homestead right. However, once a homestead is established
in Iowa an intent to occupy that would be insufficient to create a
homestead right in the first instance is nonetheless sufficient to
88
continue the homestead status. The court in McClain’s Estate
stated that once a homestead is established, it is presumed to
89
continue. A Mississippi statute attempts to narrow the definition
of home and homestead by defining these terms as the dwelling
actually occupied as the primary home of a family group that is
90
owned by the head of the family. Florida’s statutes do not define
the term homestead, but do define the term owner to include the
grantor of a revocable trust and in the same manner as if the
91
interest held in the revocable trust was owned by the grantor.
Idaho more specifically defines the term homestead as consisting of
the dwelling house, and the land upon which it sits, in which the
92
owner resides or intends to reside. This statute further expands
on the definition of homestead by including unimproved land
owned with the intention of placing a house on it and residing
93
therein. Clearly Idaho places great importance on the intent of
the property owner claiming homestead status.
Although the definitions utilized by other states with similar
homestead rights to the surviving spouse do not resolve all
ambiguity as to the meaning of the term, they are illustrative of the
argument that the homestead not only encompasses actual physical
presence in the dwelling, but also an intent to make the dwelling
one’s home even if absent from it for significant periods of time.
Further, at least two states acknowledge that the element of
ownership is satisfied even if the homestead is held by the deceased
94
grantor’s revocable trust.

87. See Berner v. Dellinger, 222 N.W. 370, 371 (Iowa 1928).
88. See In re McClain’s Estate, 262 N.W. 666, 668 (Iowa 1935). This approach
is very similar, if not identical, to the presumption given in domicile cases. See
infra notes 198-205 and accompanying text.
89. Id.
90. See M ISS. CODE ANN. § 27-33-19 (2001).
91. See FLA. STAT. ch. 732.4015(2)(a) (2001).
92. See IDAHO CODE § 55-1001 (Michie 2001).
93. Id.
94. See supra notes 67, 91 and accompanying text.
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III. LITIGATING THE ISSUE OF W HAT CONSTITUTES THE HOMESTEAD
A. Generally
As discussed in the hypotheticals in the introduction of this
article, several litigation scenarios can arise with respect to the
95
homestead descent statute.
This section will address three
96
potentially litigious areas involving the homestead. The first area
of potential litigation involves the case where the spouses are living
separately at the time of death of one of them and whether an
argument may be raised that the surviving spouse should not be
entitled to the dwelling in which the deceased spouse occupied at
the time of his or her death. The second area of potential
litigation involves the revocable trust hypothetical and whether a
dwelling transferred into a revocable trust prior to marriage is
nevertheless owned by the decedent for purposes of claiming right
of descent to the homestead. This area will be examined by
looking at the evolution of the law of trusts as applied to spousal
rights as reflected in various uniform statements of the law. The
third area of potential litigation involves aspects of the trust and
remodeling hypotheticals and arguments involving the failure to
occupy the dwelling at the time of death.
B. To Whose Homestead Does the Statute Refer: Spouses Living
Separately
When spouses reside separately at the time of death of one,
there is a natural temptation on the part of many personal
representatives of the deceased spouse, and their attorney for that
matter, to argue that the surviving spouse should not receive fee
title, or if there are children, a life estate, in the deceased spouse’s
homestead. This is particularly true if the reason for living apart
involves a breakdown of the marital relationship that has yet to
culminate in a divorce decree. Litigation may result based upon an
argument that the surviving spouse has his or her own homestead
and would therefore be inequitably benefited by receiving a

95. See supra Part I.
96. These three areas are not necessarily inclusive of all potential litigation
involving the descent of homestead statute. The author has selected these three
areas because of their similarity to actual cases he has litigated. The facts of the
hypotheticals have been changed to protect client confidentiality.
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homestead that he or she does not need. Further, the legislative
purpose of protecting the spouse from losing the roof over his or
her head does not apply to a surviving spouse who owns his or her
separate homestead. Although the lack of the surviving spouse’s
need of the decedent’s homestead as compared to the purpose of
the descent statute would seem to favor not granting homestead
rights, the clear implication under Minnesota law is that the
surviving spouse would nonetheless receive the decedent’s
97
homestead.
In a 1923 decision by the Minnesota Supreme Court, the
homestead of a decedent who was not living with his spouse but
who was living with another woman who he unlawfully attempted to
marry, descended to his lawful wife for life and the remainder to
98
their children. ’The court was not swayed by the fact that the
decedent and his unlawful wife lived together in the homestead for
99
twenty-four years. In an earlier case, the same result was reached
when the court held that a life estate to decedent’s homestead
descended to his lawful wife with whom he was not living, with the
remainder to her children, despite the fact that the decedent lived
with another woman who was not his wife, but with whom he had
100
six children. The appellate courts of this state have not recently
ruled on a case with similar facts as St. Denis and Rux. One can only
speculate as to whether the courts would be constrained by the
language of the descent of homestead statute to rule in favor of the
lawful surviving spouse, or whether the courts would carve an
exception based upon a definition of the term homestead for
purposes of rectifying a potentially inequitable result.
Further support for the argument that a spouse living
separately still has an interest in the homestead may be found in
the residential property tax statutes. A residential homestead for
property tax purposes is defined as residential real estate that is
101
occupied and used for the purposes of a homestead by its owner.
This property tax statute provides some persuasive support to the
theory that a dwelling does not lose its homestead quality merely
102
because the husband and wife are not living together.

97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.

See supra notes 95-96, infra notes 98-106 and accompanying text.
See St. Denis v. Mullen, 157 Minn. 266, 268, 196 N.W. 258, 259 (1923).
Id. at 269, 196 N.W. at 259.
See Rux v. Adam, 143 Minn. 35, 38, 172 N.W. 912, 913-914 (1919).
See M INN. STAT. § 273.124, subd. 1(a) (Supp. 2002).
Id. at subd. 1(e).
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Specifically, when a parcel of property is owned by a person who is
married, “the assessor must not deny homestead treatment in
whole or in part if only one of the spouses occupies the property
and the other spouse is absent due to: (1) marriage dissolution
proceedings, (2) legal separation, . . .or (4) other personal
103
circumstances causing the spouses to live separately. . . .”
While there may be room in the future for an equitable
argument for a change in the law with respect to whether a
surviving spouse who lives separately from the deceased spouse
should receive the deceased’s homestead, the issue of financial
need has been more recently addressed by the Minnesota Court of
Appeals. In a 1990 decision, the court held that the guardian of an
incapacitated surviving spouse, who had sufficient assets to support
her round-the-clock nursing care needs for the remainder of her
life expectancy, could nevertheless exercise the surviving spouse’s
104
right to the homestead. The court’s decision was not impacted
by the fact that by the time the matter reached the appellate court
105
the surviving spouse has died.
Clearly, financial need of a
surviving spouse is not a consideration in determining whether he
106
or she takes an interest in the homestead, and it appears that if a
dwelling is determined to be the decedent’s homestead, a surviving
spouse’s right to take an interest in it under the descent statute is
absolute.107
C. The Meaning of “Ownership”
In the hypothetical described in the introduction to this article
an issue is raised as to whether title to a dwelling that is transferred
inter-vivos into a revocable trust before marriage is considered
owned by the grantor of the trust for purposes of the surviving
108
spouse’s claim to a homestead interest in the property. Since
there is no Minnesota case law on this issue, the question is best
examined by a discussion of how various Restatements of the Law and
103. Id.
104. See In re Estate of Wentworth, 452 N.W.2d 714, 716-18 (Minn. Ct. App.
1990).
105. Id. at 719.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. See supra Part I. Note that the transfer would have to be made before the
marriage since the homestead conveyance statute would nullify any transfer of the
homestead into the trust during the marriage if the surviving spouse did not
consent to the transfer in writing. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
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the Uniform Trust Code resolve this issue. As the following discussion
will indicate, there has been a fundamental shift with respect to
whether transfers by one spouse into a revocable trust defeat the
spousal rights of the other spouse. Examination will also be made
into arguments that the failure to occupy the dwelling at the time
of death may result in litigation under the homestead descent
statute as well.
1. Revocable Inter Vivos Trusts
The increased frequency of use of revocable inter vivos trusts
as an estate planning tool is obvious to all practitioners and
generally to the public as a whole. Property transferred into a
revocable trust is, of course, no longer titled or retained in the
name of the individual grantor of the trust, but rather is titled in
109
the name of the trustee of the revocable trust. Further, title to
property held by a trustee vests with a successor trustee upon
qualification of the successor, if the trust so provides, or upon the
110
appointment of a successor trustee by the district court.
A
grantor will commonly transfer title to his or her residence to the
trustees of the revocable trust at the time the trust is created and
funded and during the lifetime of the grantor. This transfer of title
from the grantor to the trustee of a trust, and potentially to any
number of successor trustees, raises an argument that the
decedent, at his or her death, did not own the real estate in which a
surviving spouse claims a homestead interest because that real
estate was not titled in the decedent’s name. In other words, the
personal representative of a decedent’s estate may argue that the
decedent did not own the real estate held by the trustee of the
revocable trust, and consequently there is no homestead for the
111
surviving spouse to receive. Various uniform codes, restatements,
and statutes from other states have changed positions over time as
to whether a surviving spouse’s rights to a portion of a deceased
spouse’s estate can be defeated by the transfer of property into an
112
inter vivos revocable trust.
Although a spouse’s right to an
elective share or other statutory allowance is typically the subject of
109. See generally
Minnesota Trustees’ Powers Act, M INN. STAT. §
501B.81(detailing the enumerated powers of a trustee).
110. See M INN. STAT. § 501B.08 (2000).
111. This issue of ownership with respect to the descent of a homestead has
not been the subject of any appellate court decisions in the State of Minnesota.
112. See discussion infra Parts III.C-III.D.
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litigation involving the inter vivos transfer of assets into a revocable
trust, the analysis can be applied equally to the surviving spouse’s
rights to a homestead under Minnesota Statutes section 524.2113
402.
a. The Restatement of Trusts Approach
The law of trusts has undergone substantial development and
change since the use of revocable inter vivos trusts have become
commonplace in estate planning and, in fact, routinely serve as will
substitutes. Legal developments with respect to revocable trusts,
and the use of trust assets to satisfy statutory allowances, are
highlighted by the change of position between the Restatement
(Second) of Trusts and the tentative draft to Restatement (Third)
114
of Trusts. Specifically, the tentative draft to Restatement (Third)
of Trusts provides that “a revocable inter-vivos trust is ordinarily
subject to substantive restrictions on testation and to rules of
construction and other rules applicable to testamentary
dispositions, and in other respects the property of such a trust is
115
ordinarily treated as if it owned by the settlor.” The Reporter’s
Notes to this provision state that:
The position stated in these Comments and in
Subsection (2) differ fundamentally from the positions
taken in prior Restatements of Trusts.
Thus, Restatement, Second, Trusts § 57, Comment d
stated: “The rule stated in this section [that revocable
trusts are nontestamentary and valid] is applicable
although the trust is one which could not be created by
will . . . . [¶]Thus, if it is provided by statute that the wife
of a testator shall be entitled to a certain portion of his
113. The issue of ownership of revocable trust assets for purposes of defeating
a surviving spouse’s elective share rights does not arise in Minnesota given the
adoption of the concept of an augmented estate against which a surviving spouse
may make an election. See M INN. STAT. §§ 524.2-201 to -203. See also UNIF.
PROBATE CODE §§ 2-201 to -203. (11th ed. 1993). Specifically, transfers made by
the decedent to a revocable trust during the decedent’s lifetime would be
included in the augmented estate as a nonprobate transfer to others. See M INN.
STAT. § 524.2-205. As the descent of the homestead is separately addressed by
Minnesota Statutes section 524.2-402, it is excluded from computation of the value
of the augmented estate. See M INN. STAT. §§ 524.2-204 to –207.
114. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS § 57 (1959) and RESTATEMENT
(THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 25 (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1996).
115. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS: VALIDITY AND EFFECT OF REVOCABLE
INTER VIVOS TRUST § 25 (2) (Tentative Draft No. 1, 1996).
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estate of which she cannot be deprived by his will, a
married man can nevertheless transfer his property inter
vivos in trust and his widow will not be entitled on his
death to a share of the property so transferred, even
though he reserves
a life estate and power to revoke or
116
modify the trust.”
The preceding quotation illustrates the position taken by the
Restatement (Second) of Trusts that a deceased spouse could
deprive his surviving spouse of her statutory rights by transferring
117
his property into a revocable inter vivos trust.
However,
comments d and e of the Restatement (Third) of Trusts further
provide that “since the prior restatement [Restatement (Second) of
Trusts] there has been significant change in case law and especially
in legislative policy with respect to . . . matters of spousal protection
118
and the rights of creditors.”
Accordingly, the Restatement (Third) of Trusts has reversed its
position on the ability of a surviving spouse to satisfy her statutory
allowances with revocable trust assets by stating:
[I]ncreasingly, statutes and case law in the various states
are coming to recognize, as this Restatement provides,
that the rights of the spouses and creditors of testators
and settlors of revocable trusts are fundamentally alike,
because both the testator and the settlor have retained
their complete control over the property that is subject to
the will or trust instrument. Similarly, whatever the
technicalities of concept and terminology, the interests
the revocable trust beneficiaries will receive on the death
of the settlor should receive the same treatment and,
generally at least, should be subject to the same rules of
construction as the “expectancies” of devisees and
legatees.
Thus, this Restatement recognizes and gives effect to a
property owner’s right to chose among different forms
and procedures for disposition of property. Yet it seeks to
treat functional equivalents similarly, and not to allow
choice of a form either to provide an escape from serious,
substantive policies or to cause the loss of properly
relevant aids in essentially constructional matters. Such a
116. Id. at Reporter’s Notes d and e (brackets and symbols in original). Note
that Comment d referred to in this quotation, should in fact refer to Comment c.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS, § 57 n. 112 at cmt. c (1959).
117. Id.
118. Id.
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policy of treating testamentary trusts and their settlors and
beneficiaries in like manner to the treatment accorded
testators and will beneficiaries, both during life and after
death of the settlor or testator, has long been explicit in
the federal income and transfer tax systems. Early,
traditional, and still developing doctrine in trust and
probate law has been neither so clear nor so consistent.
In brief, the fundamental and pervasive policy
underlying this section and related to the rules of this
Restatement is that diverse forms of revocable trusts (i)
are valid without compliance with Wills Act formalities but
(ii) absent persuasive reason for departure, are subject to
the same restrictions (such as spousal rights) and other
119
rules and constructional aids that are applicable to wills.
Although the change of position represents a fundamental
shift from the common law and second Restatement, these
comments to Restatement (Third) of Trusts, section 25, reveal that
this change is simply an acknowledgment that the very nature and
use of revocable trusts have changed, and therefore, common sense
dictates that the law with respect to claims against trust assets must
120
also change. In fact, the comments point out that other areas of
law recognized the development of the inter vivos revocable trust as
a common estate planning tool and allow creditors to attach trust
assets to enforce debts of the individual, and permit the IRS to
enforce tax obligations owed by an individual on that person’s
121
revocable trust assets. The reasoning behind the rule allowing a
surviving spouse to attach assets of a decedent’s revocable trust is
really one of basic common sense and is best described by the
122
above-quoted phrase, “treat functional equivalents similarly.”
b. The Restatement of Property (Donative Transfers)
Approach
Further support for this shift is found in the Restatement

119. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS, § 25, cmt. a (Tentative Draft No. 1,
1996) (citing I.R.C. §§ 671-677 (income tax), §§ 2036 and 3038 (estate tax), § 2511
with Treasury Regulation, § 25.2511-2(c) (gift tax) (internal citation omitted), and
§ 2652(a) (generation-skipping transfer tax) (parenthetical information in
original)).
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Id.
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123

(Second) of Property: Donative Transfers.
The Restatement
provides that:
An inter vivos donative transfer to others than the donor’s
spouse that is a substitute for a will, or that is revocable by
the donor at the time of the donor’s death, is subject to
spousal rights of the donor’s spouse in the transferred
property that would accrue to the donor’s spouse on the
donor’s death
if the transfer had been made by the
124
donor’s will.
Therefore, this Restatement also recognizes that a revocable
trust should not deprive a surviving spouse of her statutory spousal
125
rights. Although this Restatement is primarily concerned with a
surviving spouse’s right to elective share, reference is also made in
126
the Comments to a statutory right to the homestead. This section
of the Restatement on the law of donative transfers is also
referenced in the tentative draft to the Restatement (Third) of
127
Trusts.
c. The Uniform Trust Code Approach
Although the fundamental shift in position of the Restatement
on the law of trusts is in a tentative draft format, further and
compelling evidence that the law of trusts has developed to subject
assets of a decedent’s revocable trust to statutory allowances is
provided in the recently approved Uniform Trust Code (drafted by
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
128
Laws). Specifically, the Uniform Trust Code provides that:
After the death of a settlor, and subject to the settlor’s
right to direct the source from which liabilities will be
paid, the property of a trust that was revocable at the
settlor’s death is subject to claims of the settlor’s creditors,
costs of administration of the settlor’s estate, the expenses
of the settlor’s funeral and disposal of remains, and
[statutory allowances] to a surviving spouse and children
123. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF PROPERTY: DONATIVE TRANSFERS, § 34.1(3)
(1992).
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at cmt. (k) on § 3.
127. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS: VALIDITY AND EFFECT OF REVOCABLE
INTER VIVOS TRUST § 25(2) at Reporter’s Notes d and e (Tentative Draft No. 1,
1996) (approved and recommended for enactment in all states).
128. UNIF. TRUST CODE: CREDITOR’ S CLAIMS AGAINST SETTLOR, § 505 (2000).
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to the extent the settlor’s probate estate is inadequate129to
satisfy those claims, costs, expenses, and [allowances].
The comments to the final draft of Section 505 discuss the
rationale behind the provision subjecting trust assets to claims for
statutory allowances by a surviving spouse:
Subsection (a)(3) recognizes that a revocable trust is
usually employed as a will substitute. As such, the trust
assets, following the death of the settlor, should be subject
to the settlor’s debts and other charges. However, in
accordance with traditional doctrine, the assets of the
settlor’s probate estate must normally be first exhausted
before the assets of the revocable trust can be reached.
This section does not attempt to address the procedural
issues raised by the need to first exhaust the decedent’s
probate estate to reach the assets of the revocable trust.
Nor does this section address the priority of the creditor
claims or the possible liability of the decedent’s other
nonprobate assets for the decedent’s debts and other
charges . . . as long as the rights of the creditor or family
member claiming a statutory allowance are not impaired,
the settlor is free to shift
liability from the probate estate
130
to the revocable trust.
The Uniform Trust Code, including section 505 with the
statutory allowance language, was introduced in both the
Minnesota Senate and Minnesota House of Representatives during
131
the 2001-2002 legislative session. As of the date of publication of
this article, the Senate bill has been referred to the Senate Judiciary
Committee and the House bill has been referred to the House Civil
132
Law Committee.
D. The Meaning of “Occupied”
As noted in the introductory hypotheticals, disputes may also
arise as to whether a deceased spouse occupied a dwelling at the
time of his or her death sufficient to make that dwelling a

129. Id. at § 505(3) (brackets in original).
130. UNIF. TRUST CODE: CREDITOR’ S CLAIMS AGAINST SETTLOR, Comment to §
505 (2000).
131. See S.F. 2384, 82nd Leg. Sess. (Minn. 2001-2002); H.F. 2540, 82nd Leg.
Sess. (Minn. 2001-2002).
132. S. Journal, 55th Day, 82nd Leg. Sess. 3642 (Minn. 2001-2002); and H.
Journal, 56th Day, 82nd Leg. Sess. 5033 (Minn. 2001-2002).
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133

homestead.
These issues, as well as potential arguments for
expanding the concept of occupancy for purposes of the
homestead descent statute, are more fully addressed in other
134
sections of this article.
The cases that have addressed the
occupancy requirement of homestead reveal that physical presence
at the dwelling is a necessity, but that a temporary absence, if
135
coupled with an intent to return, will not defeat occupancy.
Litigation arises when there is an absence from the dwelling and a
dispute exists as to whether the absence is temporary or permanent
and whether the absent spouse intends to return to the dwelling.
In the hypothetical where the deceased spouse is absent from
the homestead due to remodeling of the home, it may be argued
that the absence is temporary and for a definitive period of time.
That is, the spouse is only absent from the homestead for the
specific period of time that the work on the home is being
completed and, arguably, the intent to return when the work is
complete seems fairly clear. However, questions may arise whether
an elderly spouse who has been a resident of a nursing home for
the past year is only temporarily absent from the homestead. Is a
spouse with advancing Alzheimer’s ever going to return from the
nursing home to her homestead? If the spouse in the nursing
home was asked where her home was, would she identify her
homestead, and is this relevant to showing intent to return? How
should the court approach the issue of a terminally ill spouse who
is admitted to a hospital or hospice facility with no hope or
expectation of ever returning to the homestead? Certainly the law
does not require a person to die in their home to retain a
homestead classification, but the question of to what extent the
circumstances of a person’s life, and often death, may impact a
determination of their homestead may be difficult to answer.
These are some of the myriad of issues that may give rise to
litigation under the homestead descent statute, and unless the
understanding of occupancy is expanded or the presumption that
homestead status continues once established is adopted, these
issues will continue to arise and outcomes will vary according to the
136
specific facts of each case.

133.
134.
135.
136.

See supra Part I.
See infra notes 198-205 and accompanying text.
Id. See also infra notes 36-42 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 198-205 and accompanying text.
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IV. AVOIDING LITIGATION OVER THE HOMESTEAD
There are three statutory mechanisms a practitioner can utilize
to assist a client in preventing litigation over the homestead when
the client does not want the homestead to descend to the client’s
surviving spouse or surviving children.
A. Antenuptial and Postnuptial Contracts: Minn. Stat. § 519.11
Prior to the solemnization of a marriage, a couple may enter
into an antenuptial contract that determines what rights each party
has in nonmarital property upon dissolution, legal separation, or
137
the termination of the contract upon the death of one spouse.
Further, the antenuptial contract may bar the surviving spouse
from claiming rights that he or she would otherwise have against
the decedent’s estate, even though the estate is not a party to the
138
agreement.
Prior to entering an antenuptial contract, certain
139
requirements must be met. First, there must be a full and fair
140
disclosure of the earnings and property of each party. Second,
both parties must have had an opportunity to consult with legal
141
counsel of their choosing. There are also requirements to ensure
142
the proper execution of an antenuptial contract. The agreement
must be in writing, executed in the presence of two witnesses,
acknowledged by the parties, executed before a notary public, and
143
signed before the day of the wedding. A power of attorney may
144
not be used to execute an antenuptial agreement.
An
amendment to an antenuptial agreement may only be made
145
through a validly executed postnuptial agreement.
The requirements for a valid postnuptial agreement were
137. See M INN. STAT. § 519.11, subd. 1 (2000).
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. Id. See also infra notes 166-86 and accompanying text for an examination
of what constitutes full and fair disclosure.
141. Id. As a practical note, if one spouse refuses to retain counsel, the
attorney for the other should amply document their file with correspondence to
the unrepresented spouse of his or her right to counsel and a notification that the
attorney is not providing legal advice to the unrepresented spouse. Further, the
agreement should acknowledge that the unrepresented spouse is waiving his or
her right to counsel.
142. See M INN. STAT. § 519.11, subd. 2 (2000).
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. See M INN. STAT. § 519.11, subd. 2a.
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recently amended during the 2001-2002 Minnesota legislative
146
session.
Several requirements for postnuptial contracts were
unchanged by the recent amendments. For example, a postnuptial
contract must comply with all of the requirements for a valid
antenuptial contract, must be procedurally and substantively fair
and equitable at the time of execution and enforcement, must be
executed in the same manner as antenuptial contracts, and must
147
not determine child support or child custody.
Further, both
spouses must be represented by separate legal counsel, as opposed
to the antenuptial requirement that both parties must merely be
allowed the opportunity to consult with counsel of their
148
choosing.
The recent amendment to the postnuptial contract
statute is nevertheless a significant change that may make its use
more widespread. Prior to the amendment, in order for a
postnuptial contract to be valid, each of the spouses had to have
marital property, nonmarital property, or a combination of both
149
with a net value exceeding $1,200,000. Obviously, this lessened
the usefulness and frequency of use of the postnuptial statute.
Also, the previous statute provided that if either party commences
an action for dissolution or legal separation within two years of the
date of execution of the postnuptial contract the agreement is not
150
valid or enforceable.
The recent amendment eliminated the
151
monetary requirement.
This change may have the effect of
increasing the frequency of postnuptial contracts given that
couples with fewer assets now have this option. The amendment
also modified the provision that voided the agreement if either
spouse commenced a dissolution or legal separation within two
152
years.
The statute now states that if either party commences a
dissolution proceeding or proceeding for legal separation the
153
agreement is presumed to be unenforceable. This presumption
is rebuttable, however, if the spouse seeking to enforce the
postnuptial contract can establish that the contract is fair and

146. See 2002 Minn. Sess. Law Serv. ch. 338 (West); see also M INN. STAT. §
519.11, subd. 1a.
147. M INN. STAT. § 519.11, subd. 1a(2)(b).
148. Id. at subd. 1a(2)(c).
149. See id. at subd. 1a(2)(d).
150. Id. at subd. 1a(2)(e).
151. See 2002 Minn. Sess. Law. Serv. ch. 338, sec. 1 (West).
152. Id.
153. Id.
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154

equitable.
The availability of antenuptial and postnuptial
agreements as a means of avoiding litigation after death may be
extremely important for practitioners in advising their clients on
wealth transfer and estate planning.
B. Waiver of Right to Elect and of Other Rights: Minn. Stat. § 524.2213
Minnesota’s probate code provides another mechanism by
which a spouse can avoid litigation over the descent of the
homestead by having his or her spouse execute a waiver of the right
155
to election and of other rights.
Minnesota’s waiver of spousal
rights statute provides:
The right of election of a surviving spouse and the rights
of the surviving spouse to the homestead, exempt
property, and family allowance, or any of them, may be
waived, wholly or partially, after marriage, by a written
contract, agreement, or waiver signed by the party waiving
after fair disclosure. Unless it provides to the contrary, a
waiver of “all rights,” or equivalent language, in the
property or estate of a spouse is a waiver only of the right
to the elective share. Any waiver
prior to marriage must
156
be made pursuant to § 519.11.
The significant issue for the practicioner with respect to the
homestead is that if the homestead right is being waived, it must
157
include specific language to that effect.
Also of note is the
requirement that only the spouse waiving rights needs to execute
158
the document. Unlike antenuptial or postnuptial contracts, the
waiver provision does not have witnessing or attestation
159
requirements.
However, the practitioner should recommend
that any waiver be witnessed and notarized to avoid any argument
that the signature is not that of the waiving spouse and to assist in
the defense of a lack of capacity or undue influence claim that may
be made after the death of the waiving party. Finally, it should be
noted that the waiver statute requires only “fair disclosure” of
assets, whereas the antenuptial and postnuptial statute requires full
154. Id.
155. See M INN. STAT. § 524.2-213 (2000).
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. UNIF. TRUST CODE: CREDITOR’ S CLAIMS AGAINST SETTLOR, § 505 (2000). Cf.
M INN. STAT. § 519.11 (2000).
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160

and fair disclosure.
While no appellate court in Minnesota has yet drawn a
distinction between the differing terms used in these two statutes,
an argument may be made that the waiver statute requires a
161
disclosure that is less detailed than does the antenuptial statute.
A justification for a lesser standard of disclosure may be that a
spouse who executes a waiver of spousal rights is in a better
position to have information as to what assets the non-waiving
spouse owns. Whereas, in the antenuptial setting a prospective
spouse may not have the type of access or information prior to the
marriage as to the other prospective spouse’s assets. Another
justification for a lesser standard may be that the danger of
coercion by one spouse against another, by for example
threatening to call off the wedding, is diminished when the waiver
is executed during the marriage. The waiver of spousal rights is a
very effective way to minimize the chance of expensive and
protracted litigation, and may be easier to procure if a spouse is
reluctant to execute an antenuptial contract because he or she
desires to protect their interests in the event of a divorce.
C. Miscellaneous Considerations for the Practitioner
1. Adequate Inquiry Into Your Client’s Wishes
Invariably, if litigation erupts over the surviving spouse’s rights
upon the death of a client, to the homestead or otherwise, there
will be no end to the individuals willing to testify as to what were
the decedent’s wishes. The surviving spouse will be prepared to
testify that the decedent told her on one or more occasions that the
house will be hers upon his death. Whereas, the personal
representative or trustee, who also happens to be an heir, will be
ready to testify that the decedent did not want his wife to have
anything from his estate. It is therefore incumbent upon the
practitioner to thoroughly ascertain the estate planning client’s
wishes, particularly with respect to the homestead, which in many
cases may be the most significant asset in the estate. By
understanding the client’s wishes with respect to what the surviving
spouse will claim upon the client’s death, the practitioner is better
160. Compare M INN. STAT. § 524.2-213, and M INN. STAT. § 519.11. See also
discussion infra at notes 166-86 and accompanying text.
161. See discussion infra notes 166-86 and accompanying text.
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able to offer alternatives such as a waiver or postnuptial contract.
Also, by confirming the client’s wishes apart from a testamentary
instrument, through correspondence or a videotaped meeting, the
practitioner may also prevent a decedent’s heirs from attempting to
obstruct a surviving spouse’s claims for spousal rights when the
intent and expectation of the decedent was that his surviving
spouse would receive the full benefit of her statutory entitlements.
2. Filing Petition Asserting Homestead Rights
Although Minnesota case law indicates that a surviving
spouse’s life estate or fee interest in the homestead, as the case may
be, vests upon the decedent’s death, the surviving spouse must still
take an action to assert and preserve this right under the descent of
162
homestead statute. The descent statute provides that a surviving
spouse is deemed to consent to any testamentary or other
disposition of the homestead to which the spouse has not
previously consented to in writing unless a petition is filed asserting
the homestead rights in the same manner as a petition for an
163
elective share.
The time limit for filing a petition for elective
share is nine months from the date of death, or six months after
164
admission of the will to probate, whichever is later to occur. An
extension may be sought from the court to extend the time for
165
making an election.
3. Fair Disclosure in Executing a Waiver
As previously discussed, the disclosure requirement of a waiver
of spousal rights, including the right to the homestead, may be
waived only “after fair disclosure,” whereas the antenuptial and
166
postnuptial contract statute requires full and fair disclosure.
Since there are no cases discussing what fair disclosure means
under the waiver statute it is unclear whether the same standard for
disclosure applies to waivers of spousal rights and antenuptial
contracts. Arguments may be made that the waiver statute requires
a lesser amount of disclosure than does an antenuptial or

162. See supra note 47 and accompanying text. See also M INN. STAT. § 524.2402(d (2000).
163. M INN. STAT. § 524.2-402(d).
164. See M INN. STAT. § 524.2-211.
165. Id.
166. See supra notes 140, 161 and accompanying text.
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167

postnuptial contract.
However, for the practitioner intent on
avoiding litigation for his or her client on the issue of whether a
waiver is void for lack of fair disclosure, the best approach is to read
the two statutes as requiring the same level of disclosure.
Therefore, an examination as to what constitutes full and fair
disclosure is warranted.
The Minnesota Supreme Court has said that the preferred
method of fully and fairly disclosing earnings and property under
the antenuptial statute is to attach complete and detailed financial
168
statements.
However, the court did not make this a
169
requirement.
The court in McKee-Johnson found that the
antenuptial agreement met the requirements for procedural
fairness in that the wife was advised of, and waived, her right to
consult with independent counsel and that the agreement was
170
signed upon full and fair disclosure. With regard to full and fair
disclosure, attached to the antenuptial agreement were detailed
and complete financial statements in which both parties disclosed
171
assets, liabilities, net worth, and earnings.
The court said that
they had previously suggested these types of statements and other
jurisdictions also looked favorably on such statements as satisfying
172
the full and fair disclosure requirement. The court held that “to
so attach those statements, it appears to be an appropriate and
practical way in which to comply with the disclosure
173
requirement.”
There is case law in Minnesota that holds that full and fair
disclosure under the antenuptial statute was made without the
174
rendering of complete and detailed financial statements. In one
such case, the Minnesota Supreme Court found that since the
plaintiff and defendant had been acquainted with each other for
twenty years prior to their marriage, had visited one another’s
homes, and Plaintiff had visited Defendant’s farms the court held
that “Plaintiff was familiar with and had full knowledge of the
extent and nature of Defendant’s property when the antenuptial

167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.

Id.
See McKee-Johnson v. Johnson, 444 N.W.2d 259, 266 (Minn. 1989).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See infra notes 175-76 and accompanying text.
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175

agreement was made.” Further, in a 1984 Minnesota Court of
Appeals case, the court found sufficient disclosure when the party
requesting the antenuptial agreement stated to his future wife that
he was worth approximately $300,000 to $400,000, when in fact he
176
was worth $750,000.
The court commented that “[t]his
understatement gave the wife a grossly deflated view of her
husband’s estate. However, the record as a whole does support that
the trial court’s finding that the discrepancy was a good faith error
177
resulting from explosive growth in the real estate market.”
In an early case, the court found that a confidential
relationship voided the antenuptial contract because the defendant
never allowed his future spouse to become acquainted with the full
value of his property and that “[i]t was his duty to inform her, as
well as to advise her of the nature and extent of the interest in his
178
estate that she was giving up.” This case involved the marriage of
an older man of substantial means to a significantly younger
fiancée who was pregnant with their child, and to whom he
provided no information as to his assets, nor informed her
179
regarding her entitlements under the law upon his death.
A
similar result occurred in a case involving a sixty-six year old retired
farmer who married a fifty-eight year old German immigrant with
180
marginal skills in the English language. The court found that
because Plaintiff was without business experience and no match for
her husband with regard to negotiating the terms of antenuptial
agreements, and since there did not appear to be any particular
disclosure made as to the husband’s property and assets, the
181
antenuptial agreement was invalid and unenforceable.
Another case illustrates how courts have treated situations
where one future spouse springs an antenuptial agreement upon
182
the other.
In this case, the wife was told five days prior to the
wedding that if she did not sign the antenuptial agreement there
183
184
would be no marriage.
She therefore signed.
The court
175.
176.
177.
178.
(1911).
179.
180.
181.
182.
183.
184.

See Gertner v. Gertner, 246 Minn. 319, 325, 74 N.W.2d 809, 814 (1956).
See Hill v. Hill, 356 N.W.2d 49, 53 (Minn. Ct. App. 1984).
Id.
See Slingerland v. Slingerland, 115 Minn. 270, 275, 132 N.W. 326, 328
Id. at 272, 132 N.W. at 327.
See Stanger v. Stanger, 152 Minn. 489, 490-91, 189 N.W. 402, 403 (1922).
Id. at 491, 189 N.W. at 403.
See Rudbeck v. Rudbeck, 365 N.W.2d 330 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985).
Id. at 332.
Id.
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invalidated the antenuptial agreement because the wife had no
meaningful opportunity to consult with an attorney and because
185
the husband failed to make full disclosure.
The husband’s
argument that he did make full disclosure is that his wife “had the
opportunity to determine the extent of his assets because of all the
186
‘stuff laying all over [his] desk.’”
4. Discovery Practice in Homestead Litigation
For the practitioners who do find themselves representing a
client in homestead or other spousal rights litigation, the aggressive
use of written and deposition discovery may be helpful in obtaining
a speedy resolution to the case, either through summary judgment
or settlement. Interrogatories requesting information about the
nature, location, amount of the decedent’s assets, dates of transfers
made by the decedent, and information regarding the expected
testimony of witnesses are just some of the areas where relevant
187
information may arise.
Also, requests for production of
documents seeking tax returns, property tax classifications,
mortgage documents, deeds, lines of credit, or invoices for utility
services or renovations may assist in establishing incidents of
ownership in the event that ownership of the dwelling is
188
challenged.
Finally, with respect to written discovery, detailed
requests for admissions may assist in narrowing the issues for trial
189
or for a summary judgment motion. Selected depositions of the
decedent’s personal representatives, trustees, children, other estate
beneficiaries, or even close friends early in the litigation may help
facilitate resolution and will help to root out all of the statements
190
allegedly made by the decedent to these individuals.
5. Use of Summary Judgment Motions to Expedite Resolution
Minnesota summary judgment “shall be rendered forthwith if
the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and
admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that either

185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.

Id.
Id. at 333.
See M INN. R. CIV. P. 33.
See M INN. R. CIV. P. 34.
See M INN. R. CIV. P. 36.
See M INN. R. CIV. P. 30.
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party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” The summary
judgment standard is a familiar one and is looked upon favorably as
a means to dispose of litigation where it is clear that no material
fact issues exist and a party is entitled to judgment as a matter
192
law. A material fact, for the purposes of summary judgment, is a
193
fact which will affect the outcome of the case.
The United States Supreme Court has stated that the plain
language of Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which
sets the same standard as Rule 56 of the Minnesota Rules of Civil
Procedure, mandates the entry of summary judgment in the
following instance:
[A]fter adequate time for discovery and upon motion,
against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to
establish the existence of an element essential to that
party’s case, and on which that party will bear the burden
of proof at trial. In such a situation, there can be “no
genuine issue as to any material fact,” since a complete
failure of proof concerning an essential element of the
non-moving194party’s case necessarily renders all other facts
immaterial.
A motion for summary judgment may be appropriate in
homestead litigation since, other than the case in which conflicting
statements from the decedent are argued, the facts surrounding
the issue of whether a dwelling was owned or occupied might not
be in dispute. For example, in the two hypotheticals discussed in
the introduction of this article there will likely be no dispute that
the wife transferred her house into a revocable trust prior to the
marriage or that she resided in a nursing home for the last year of
195
her life. Likewise, there will likely not be a dispute as to whether
the husband who died in the car accident while his home was being
remodeled intended to move into the home with his wife once the
renovations were complete, or that he and his wife were living in
196
her home at the time of his death. Summary judgment motions
in both of these hypotheticals may be an appropriate and
191. M INN. R. CIV. P. 56.03; see also M INN. GEN. R. PRAC. DIST. CT. 115
(describing the procedure for bringing a motion for summary judgment).
192. See Carlisle v. City of Minneapolis, 437 N.W.2d 712, 715 (Minn. Ct. App.
1989).
193. Zappa v. Fahey, 310 Minn. 555, 556, 245 N.W.2d 258, 259-60 (1976).
194. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986).
195. See supra Part I.
196. Id.
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expedient way to resolve contested issues of what constitutes the
decedent’s homestead, or at a minimum move the case toward
197
settlement.
V. A PROPOSAL FOR AN EXPANDED DEFINITION OF HOMESTEAD IN
THE PROBATE CODE
A. Generally
Given the potential for litigation in determining what
constitutes a decedent’s homestead and whether it is owned and
occupied by the decedent at the time of death, this author suggests
that a homestead should be determined in much the same way that
a person’s domicile is determined. What follows is a discussion on
how domicile is determined and how this analysis may be used to
resolve the ambiguity that exists with respect to the descent of
homestead statute.
B. An Analogy to Domicile
Domicile requires a person’s physical presence at a location
198
coupled with an intention to make that location one’s home. To
acquire a new domicile there must be a union of residence with an
199
intent to make the place one’s home. As the Minnesota Supreme
Court has stated, “residence without intention, or intention without
200
residence, is of no avail.”
Once domicile is established it is
201
presumed to continue until the contrary is shown. The court in
Smith found that a change in domicile was justified because the
decedent had taken the following actions: opened a bank account
in a particular county; changed his address with the post office; told
acquaintances of his intent to remain in the county; and identified
202
himself in court documents as being a resident of that county.
Clearly a person’s intention to make a particular location his or her

197. The author has noted that in these cases the basic facts are not generally
disputed, but rather the application of these facts to the definition of homestead is
what is in dispute, which can be resolved by summary judgment.
198. See Manthey v. Comm’r of Revenue, 468 N.W.2d 548, 549 (Minn. 1991).
See Smith v. Smith, 242 Minn. 85, 89, 64 N.W.2d 129, 131 (1954).
199. Manthey, 468 N.W.2d at 549; Smith, 242 Minn. at 89, 64 N.W.2d at 131.
200. Davidner v. Davidner, 304 Minn. 491, 493, 232 N.W.2d 5, 7 (1975).
201. See Manthey, 468 N.W.2d at 550.
202. Smith, 242 Minn. at 89-90, 64 N.W.2d at 132.
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domicile is of paramount importance.
In terms of an absence from a person’s established domicile
and the effect of an absence, Minnesota courts have held that a
mere change of residence, although continued for a long time,
203
does not change a person’s domicile. The court in Davidner v.
Davidner found that a physician with an established domicile in
Minnesota did not change his domicile although he moved to Utah
204
for a significant period of time to complete his medical residency.
This holding comports with the general rule that while a person
can have only one domicile, he or she may have more than one
205
residence.
Notions of domicile and homestead naturally have some
commonalties, including a physical presence at a location and
varying degrees of intent to make the location one’s domicile or
homestead. Further, temporary absence from the domicile or
homestead for varying lengths of time does not defeat a claim of
domicile or homestead. This article proposes that these common
elements should be even more closely aligned with each other.
That is, an intention of a decedent to make a dwelling his or her
homestead should be given greater consideration and weight, as it
is in determining domicile. Further, once a physical presence has
been established at a dwelling, combined with an intent to make
the dwelling one’s homestead, a presumption should attach that
this dwelling is the person’s homestead until a contrary intention is
shown. Finally, this author suggests that prolonged physical
absences from a homestead should not give rise to arguments that
the dwelling is no longer the person’s homestead. To expand the
concept of homestead and its definition of a dwelling owned and
occupied for purposes of the descent statute to the same standards
on which a person’s domicile is determined will greatly clarify the
ambiguity that exists and likely eliminate many of the litigious
issues that arise. Further, this expanded concept of a homestead
under the descent statute is appropriate given Minnesota’s longstanding protection of the surviving spouse and children with
respect to homestead rights.

203. See Davidner, 304 Minn. at 493-94, 232 N.W.2d at 7; Berc v. Berc, 407
N.W.2d 131, 135 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
204. Davidner, 304 Minn. at 493-494, 232 N.W.2d at 7.
205. Mut. Serv. Cas. Ins. Co. v. Olson, 402 N.W.2d 621, 624 (Minn. Ct. App.
1987).
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VI. CONCLUSION
Minnesota has long provided a surviving spouse and children
with life estate and fee rights in the decedent’s homestead. With
the increased frequency of second marriages or marriages
occurring later in life the potential for litigation over what
constitutes a decedent’s homestead has also increased, often at the
cost of significant estate assets in attorneys’ fees and expenses. A
greater awareness on the part of the estate planning practitioner of
mechanisms, such as the waiver of homestead rights, will help to
minimize the incidents of contested proceedings involving the
homestead and ensure that a decedent’s wishes are fulfilled.
Expanded concepts of ownership, which would include homesteads
held in revocable trusts, and occupancy, which should hinge on the
decedent’s intent to return to the homestead even during
significant absences, will further clarify the issue and protect the
rights of the surviving spouse and children in the homestead.
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